[“Dodge or Die” is a series of reports on the relationship between the pedestrian and the motorist in Georgia by Robert Linkous].

As Stephen Dowling put it in his BBC News article a few years ago, “when it comes to crossing the road, there's no such thing as an international standard. Every country does it differently.” How people drive and cross the road, according to Dowling, is a matter of a country’s cultural values. Is it really?

Bad traffic habits are a grave problem in many cities around the world. Yet, while many have managed to largely solve the problem, in Georgia, the problem remains virulent and it is not even fully appreciated. Observing the traffic dynamics in a couple of main avenues, like Rustaveli or Chavchavadze, is sufficient for a first-time visitor to Tbilisi to realize that something is wrong with the Tbilisi traffic system. Yes, that’s right – something is wrong with the system, not culture!

Game Theory, a field of applied mathematics that is used to analyze “strategic interactions” between agents who pursue conflicting goals, can possibly explain what is going on in the streets of Tbilisi. Strategic interaction is just a fancy name for what happens in games, such as chess, or in real-life situations such as bargaining over the price of a taxi ride. Luckily, Game Theory also points to a possible policy solution.

The first relevant insight from Game Theory is that the behavior of traffic participants is determined by their expectations about the behavior of other actors. For instance, if pedestrians don’t expect drivers to stop at a zebra crossing, they will hesitate to cross until they are 120% sure that the car approaching them is actually stopping. Given the very steep price for making a judgment mistake, the result is a very stable behavioral pattern. Pedestrians won’t cross. As someone who makes every effort not to do as the Romans do in Rome, I rediscover this time and again whenever I am slowing down before a zebra crossing. It takes intensive hand waving and actual stopping for the pedestrians to understand my intentions and adjust their expectations accordingly.

The same logic applies to the behavior of drivers. Any driver familiar with the Tbilisi rules of the game would not slow down before a zebra crossing because it makes no sense. Pedestrians would in any case not trust his/her intentions and would patiently wait for the car to pass (or stop, in the rare case it is driven by a foreigner like myself). Moreover, it makes sense for a Tbilisi driver to speed up whenever he or she observes a group of pedestrians getting ready to cross the road on a zebra. Why? Because by speeding up s/he sends a clear signal about his/her behavior – hey, I am not going to stop, don’t even try crossing!

The second key insight from Game Theory is that this kind of “uncivilized” outcome (drivers not giving way and pedestrians not even trying to cross on a zebra) is stable. In other words, it does not make sense for drivers and pedestrians to change their “strategy” (behavior) given what they know about the other party’s strategy. The implication is that Tbilisi will be forever stuck with this uncivilized “equilibrium” (another fancy term used by game theorists). Unless someone (the policymaker) bothers to change the rules of the game and reset expectations. More on this later.

By now it should be easy to see the possibility – observed in most European and North American cities – of a situation that is the exact mirror image of the situation in Tbilisi: drivers respecting pedestrians’ rights and pedestrians being quite assertive about exercising them. Not only is this civilized equilibrium possible, but it is also quite stable. If drivers expect the pedestrians to cross on a zebra, they will start slowing down well before the first pedestrian sets his/her foot on the road. Expecting this type of behavior, pedestrians will not hesitate to cross. The outcome is stable because it makes no sense for German drivers to start behaving in Tbilisi style (they will quickly find themselves behind bars) and there is no point for the German pedestrians to hesitate before crossing.

Two crucial questions are these:

1) How come some countries are stuck in a bad kind of equilibrium while others are able to enjoy the benefits of civilization?

2) Can a country (or city) permanently shift from one type of equilibrium to another?

Before I proceed with a formal “solution”, let me say that the same exact questions apply to many other areas of strategic interaction among people. For instance – and this is an important hint – it applies to petty corruption, e.g. the interaction among bribe givers and takers. And as we know from Georgia’s recent experience (both good and bad), a determined policy intervention or the breakdown of law and order can swiftly shift a country from one equilibrium to another. Moreover, a determined policy action can lead to a permanent adjustment of expectations, and, yes, a change in culture!

The obvious policy solution is to introduce tougher regulations, higher fines and stricter enforcement concerning both drivers and pedestrians. As far as traffic regulations are concerned, Georgia has already had a positive experience with the introduction of fines for not wearing seatbelts. The policy worked extremely well and led to an instantaneous change in the drivers’ behavior. Ideally, strict rules should be enforced for all kinds of violations including the widespread practice of parking on sidewalks – forcing pedestrians to share their already limited space with cars. An effort should be made to improve the underpasses they are often dirty and insufficiently illuminated, giving incentives to jaywalking. The fines for jaywalking should be increased from their current, ridiculously low level of 3 GEL.

Understandably, enforcement would have to be particularly strict during a relatively short transition period to allow all traffic participants to properly reset their expectations and behavior. Once expectations are reset, however, the intensity of enforcement (and related costs) could go down quite dramatically because the new equilibrium will be able to sustain itself. At least according to insights from Game Theory.