In the globally very turbulent 2024, Georgia was under the spotlight in the global arena, but not for a good reason and with nothing to celebrate. On the contrary, this spotlight was earned by its government’s risky shift away from the EU trajectory and, post the 26 October Parliamentary election, the powerful, non-stop peaceful street protests of the pro-European population in the capital Tbilisi and other cities, those demanding free and fair new elections.
The one-party Parliament, the government, and the new President, those not recognized or collaborated with by democracies internationally and rejected by a substantial part of the local population resulted in post-election crises and received formal cautions from the European Union and the USA due to the backsliding of democracy and turning away from the EU membership agenda in the move towards autocracy and the Russian orbit of influence. In late 2024, these led to the introduction of international financial and travel sanctions for leaders of the ruling party and government officials from a number of European states – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the UK, alongside the USA, Ukraine, and Canada. One often hears, from within the country and outside, that Georgia is edging towards the model of Belarus, or ‘Belarusization’. Pro-democracy Georgians acknowledge this with pain as this is not only a historically and constitutionally unacceptable prospect, but it also entails reversing many major accomplishments the country has achieved and celebrated over the last few decades since independence – including wasting those efforts invested in the institution-building agenda, where inclusive political institutions create the foundations not only for democracy but also for economic development and wellbeing. (Strong arguments made in Nobel prize winning authors’ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s 2012 bestseller Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty).
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, post-soviet countries chose different paths and models of statehood and public governance. Belarus and certain other post-Soviet countries never embarked on democratic reforms or the creation of inclusive, western-type independent institutions. This is just one essential feature that makes Georgia fundamentally different. The creation of inclusive independent institutions contributed to Georgia’s success as a top reformer and a showcase of best practices in the region across (not all but) many fields. Even in the dark 1990s, including Shevardnadze’s era, when the democracy and market economy building reform implementation was poisoned by overwhelming corruption, the country still started building independent institutions. This is true for both public and non-governmental institutions (NGOs). Independent, very strong, and vocal non-governmental institutions emerged intensively in the 1990s, and by 2000 Georgia had one of the highest numbers of NGOs in the region. Civil society has been most active as the defenders of human rights, watchdogs of reform and anticorruption implementation, and activists that protect the interests of the poor, minorities, and of vulnerable populations. Several competent non-partisan independent think tanks also emerged, contributing to evidence-based policymaking. The country moreover enabled independent media and political pluralism through the free practice of multiple political parties. A key test for Georgia’s young democracy was the peaceful handover of power in the 2012 elections, moving from the National Movement led by Saakashvili to the Georgian Dream led by Ivanishvili. Furthermore, beyond non-governmental institutions, Georgia shaped a number of independent (regulatory) public institutions within various sectors, such as the central bank and the education quality enhancement institution.
Unlike Georgia, Belarus never succeeded in creating vocal civil society players, or independent public or quasi-public institutions. By their nature, autocracies do not have the incentive to shape an enabling environment for vocal civil society development or for independent think tanks, while there is no framework for independent public institutions to make independent public policy decisions in the best interest of the country and its population. Instead, under autocratic rule, political and economic institutions are of an extractionist nature, functioning in the interest of extracting benefits for the ruling elite and reinforcing centralized decision-making.
While Georgia’s fragile democracy has greatly benefitted over the decades from the voice of an advanced and active civil society, the 2023 adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence (popularly known as the ‘Russian Law’ due to its similarities with that of Russia) introduces a state control mechanism over NGOs and media outlets, and it provides instruments for the authorities to enable selective treatment and to damage the enabling environment for the media and independent civil society.
Georgia’s central bank – the National Bank of Georgia – was established in 1991 in its current form. It was independent of state intervention, not only by the constitution but also in practice, thereby ensuring macro-financial stability in the country. Eventually, with decades of close collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, NBG became a highly competent, Western-type central bank, fully compliant with international best practices, as evidenced by multiple high-ranking international recognitions and memberships. Its independence came under risk in 2023 after the introduction of changes in its governance, resulting in crises in its management – three competent Vice-Governors and a senior advisor resigned in protest of the decision. This also alarmed the IMF and prolonged the suspended state of the IMF program for Georgia.
Another example is the National Center for Education Quality Enhancement (NCEQE), established in its initial form in 2006 and transformed into its current form in 2010, and independent in its activities and operations, which aims to fully align the country’s educational standards and regulations with those of European and other best international practices. This led to Georgia becoming a governmental member of the European Quality Assurance Registry (EQAR) in 2008 and the NCEQE becoming a member of the European Network for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) in 2019. However, the 2023 ENQA assessment identified state intervention and influence over NCEQE management and its decisions to be unacceptable developments, leading to the exclusion of Georgia from EQAR listing and a risk of ENQA exclusion in 2025.
These unwelcome and highly disturbing individual institutional cases create an alarming trend. Georgia has strong, competent independent inclusive institutions with well-trained staff, both non-governmental and public, which have helped the country succeed in the recent past, through the headwinds of economic crises, and in advancing the EU alignment agenda. One fatal mistake Georgia has made across all ruling parties is its failure to implement judicial reform fully and entirely and to create an independent judiciary. This has particularly strongly backfired at present, when the independent ruling of the court, free from any political influences, is most critical and would have made a major difference in solving the current crisis.
When in 2023 Georgia received EU Candidate country status, it included nine steps set out in the European Commission recommendations document of 8 November. Unsurprisingly, several of these steps indirectly refer to the role of independent and inclusive institutions, and two of these steps directly call for ensuring the independence of specific institutions. While Georgia’s EU accession process was stopped, the agenda of independence of institutions remains most relevant in every circumstance.