When Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich decided not to sign the association agreement with the European Union and instead opted for a Russian package of long-term economic support, many Ukrainians perceived this not to be a purely economic decision. Rather, they feared this to be a renunciation of Western cultural and political values, and – to put it mildly – were not happy about this development.

When Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich decided not to sign the association agreement with the European Union and instead opted for a Russian package of long-term economic support, many Ukrainians perceived this not to be a purely economic decision. Rather, they feared this to be a renunciation of Western cultural and political values, and – to put it mildly – were not happy about this development.

On January 24, 2013, Robert Tchaidze, Senior Economist with the European Department of the IMF, delivered a presentation titled “Turkey: From Crisis to Recovery, 1999-2005.” The presentation covered the causes of the 2001 crisis, the anti-crisis programs undertaken by the Turkish government in cooperation with the IMF, and the country’s subsequent recovery.

The question of the title seems to be a rhetorical one. With the 2008 global financial crisis fresh in our minds, the logic of the vicious cycle between the economic slowdown, troubles in the banking sector, credit crunch, and the subsequent industrial decline reinforcing the credit conundrums seems quite apparent.

The scars of the 2008 global financial crisis and the festering wounds of the ongoing European debt crisis seem to have obscured one simple textbook truth.